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HUMAN RIGHTS BEYOND DICHOTOMY BETWEEN 
CULTURAL UNIVERSALISM AND RELATIVISM
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Abstract: The consolidation of relations of global society requires the progressive establishment of a global 
legal system, consisting of a system of rules —precisely, human rights— as the source and evaluation 
criteria of positive national rights. This essay aims to contribute to some extent using reflective dialectical 
methodology, establishing logical-argumentative criteria, based on the dialogue between authors to exercise 
a critical reflection of the official narrative on the universality of human rights, in addition overcoming 
the universalism/relativism dichotomy eurocentricaly established by a theory of human rights between 
universalism and cultural relativism.
Keywords: human rights; universality; multiculturalism; cultural relativism
Summary: 1. IntrodutIon. 2. the hIstorIcal-IdeologIcal constructIon of human rIghts. 3. eurocentrIsm 
In the dIscourse of human rIghts. 4. the Issue of multIculturalIsm and human rIghts. 5. conclusIon
1. IntrodutIon
There are strong criticisms of the attempts to create a world political order based 
on the defense of human rights, allowing international organizations and major powers 
to implement a centralized policy of “humanitarian” intervention, situated above the 
sovereignty of States, using even of war resources if necessary. In this line of argument, 
there are those who accuse the West of using “human rights rhetoric” to cover up their 
true political and economic interests and, through that discourse, impose its policies on 
the rest of the world. The process leading to the creation and consolidation of human 
rights is contemporary to the expansion of Europe and the West over the whole world and 
inextricably linked to this process and its contradictions.
If, in the so-called West, the consolidation of some fundamental rights was 
the result of many struggles and conflicts and wars, non-European countries excluded 
from this process since the beginning and not infrequently participated as victims. The 
approach to the issue of human rights comes as a more tortuous issue to jurists faced with 
dilemmas that have assumed an enormous degree of importance with the intra-frontier 
and international community and which, at the same time, have not yet achieved unity of 
thought that allows its organization to ensure universal protection.
It is, therefore, relevant to the establishment of a set of universal human rights to 
try to find, at least, a minimum set of guarantees capable of assuring the dignity of the 
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human person. The very notion of dignity is problematic for the solution of this impasse, 
as each country, and within each of these countries, each culture sheltered by them, tends 
to establish its own conception of human dignity. To discuss a theory of human rights 
necessarily leads to a reference to the juridical theory of this class of rights, enshrined 
by a range of treaties, conventions and laws that define and regulate both national and 
international, guarantors of the fundamental rights of the human person; secondly, not 
least, the necessary reference to the theoretical basis of human rights, lacking a reflection 
that takes into account all the issues that are intrinsic and extrinsic to them: cultural, social, 
political, religious, gender, ethnic, economic, mental, technological, biotechnological, 
among others, and no less relevant, to fail to conceive placidly as if ultimate, universal 
and perfect truth were the various social facts politically placed in the world today.
Therefore, it is a task, by scientific vocation, faced by the theory and practice of 
human rights, to overcome these social situations in terms of values  and norms, which 
ensure the dignity of the human person. Although the ideal of human rights seeks a 
universality of consecration and respect in the rights that must be fulfilled, the different 
cultures, religions and customs of the different country show that the practice of human 
rights is not so simple, on the contrary, it is difficult.
However, the movement of globalization and the international benefits that the 
countries receive, necessitate the incorporation of human rights norms. The fulfillment 
of norms concerning human rights, even when these are not in keeping with the culture 
of their country, leads to the conclusion that in this action lies a true moral content, 
which, in Kant’s eyes, means fulfillment not for duty, but out of duty. Human rights 
have a highly moral content; all the declarations related to this right prescribe norms of 
conduct to be fulfilled by the states that they sign and even, to a certain extent, to their 
non-signatories, since the UN has unconventional mechanisms in case of violation to 
human rights in countries. Then the questions begin: what is the foundation of human 
rights? How is the situation between the universality sought by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the traditions derived from different cultures? There are several 
currents, and this essay aims at examining, according to parameters of contemporary 
anthropology, multiculturalism, especially in democratic societies of law, to express 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of new juridicities, as well as to compare national and 
international norms, such as the International Criminal Court and the European Court 
of Human Rights, understood as elements of reaffirmation of the social commitment 
to human rights and to the practices of citizenship as a space for struggle and human 
emancipation. In this perspective, it is intended to reiterate that the construction of a 
theory justifying human rights requires overcoming the dichotomy of universalism and 
relativism.
2. the hIstorIcal-IdeologIcal constructIon of human rIghts
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed in 1948, reported what would 
be the beginning of a new era in which the assumption of the elevation of human rights 
would be of interest to the international community. This was what the legion of the 
oppressed, detested, massacred and persecuted from the outside world expected.
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This declaration was of unequivocal importance, which is why his text was 
immediately referred to by some constitutions. But, unfortunately, it is not legally 
enforceable for all States to observe; this situation led to the need for the elaboration of 
a number of protocols that strengthened and gave particularity to the rights present in its 
text, with a view to their recognition and effectiveness by the States.
Between 1945 and 1966, a number of key international human rights documents 
were drawn up, granting them mandatory legal status, a hard law, with the ratification of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of 1966, in addition to the optional protocols to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which constitute the International 
Bill of Human Rights.
About this Declaration, Comparato (2001, p. 226) teaches that:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted under the impact 
of the atrocities committed during World War II. Taking up the ideals of 
the French Revolution, it represented the historical manifestation that 
the recognition of the supreme values  of equality, freedom and fraternity 
among men had finally been formed. The crystallization of these ideals in 
effective rights will be progressively, at the national and international level, 
as the result of a systematic effort of human rights education.
Barreto (2010, p.8) argues that human rights “first became a process of recovering 
the foundations of the legal system in the moral argumentation”.
In order to do so, it was necessary to substitute the normative totality intended 
by the sovereign’s will for a set of original rights, an expression of natural freedom and 
equality between men. It is important to point out that this set of rights starts from a 
presumption of ownership of a subject conceived through a Thomist vision of person, that 
is, man would be composed of spiritual and bodily substance. This conception of person 
led to the elaboration of the principle of the essential equality of every human being, 
notwithstanding individual and group differences, biological or cultural. For Comparato 
(2001, p.19), it is this essential equality of the person that forms the nucleus of the universal 
concept of human rights. “The expression is not pleonastic, since these are rights common 
to every human species, every man as a man, which result from his own nature, and are 
not mere political creations.”
The human being has no price, but a dignity, since it does not allow substitution 
for another equivalent, being an end in itself. According to Kant (1995, p. 71), “in the 
realm of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. When a thing has a price, it can 
be put instead of any other as equivalent; but when a thing is above all price, it does not 
allow equivalent, so it has dignity.” The author goes on to explain that what constitutes 
the condition only thanks to anything can be an end in itself, has not only a relative value, 
that is, a price, but an intimate value, i.e., dignity. Morality and humanity are the only 
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things that have dignity. Now every man has dignity, for humanity as a species, every 
human being, in his individuality, is properly irreplaceable, and can not be exchanged for 
anything, being an end in itself.
The term “human rights” is not unanimous in doctrine. There are authors who 
prefer other nomenclatures. An example of this is that according to Fernandez (1991, 
p. 78), the expression that best defines the current theoretical situation of human rights is 
“fundamental rights of man”, for the following reasons:
It is intended to show that every person has moral rights because they are 
so and that they must be recognized and guaranteed by society, by law and 
by political power without any kind of social, economic, legal, political, 
ideological or cultural discrimination. or sexual. These rights are extremely 
connected with the idea of  human dignity and are at the same time the 
conditions for the development of this idea of  dignity. (Fernandez 1991,  
p. 78)
The French doctrine commonly uses the term “public liberties”; the German 
one uses more frequently the term “subjective public rights”. The Charter of the United 
Nations uses both the term “human rights” (preamble and article 56) and “fundamental 
freedoms” (art. 56 (c)).
Human rights exist even without positive recognition, that is, there is no need 
for any law to prescribe it so that people are holders of human rights. Human rights are 
not precisely related to the natural characteristics of man, nor to his original position of 
society, “because they are independent of any legislation, legal title or tradition. Rights 
that do not need to be attributed are irrevocable and inalienable” (Barreto, 2010, p.11). 
Complementing this reasoning, for the author, human rights are an expression that 
combines law and morality and express, since the eighteenth century basically:
respect for the dignity of the human person, the right to life, the equality of 
all men before the law, security, freedom of expression, access to education 
and the right to political participation. All these rights are based more on 
the feeling of an original right than on the expression through the positive 
sovereign law. These rights, in the historical process of their affirmation, 
served and serve to evaluate the laws from the angle of their ethical 
foundation and, therefore, to legitimize or delegitimize them. (Barreto, 
2010, p.11).
Fernandez (1991, p. 79) states that “we can only consider human needs as human 
needs that demand their satisfaction unconditionally.” According to Ramos (2005, p.33), 
“human rights norms, vague or full of indeterminate concepts, incessantly need the 
judicial realization of their scope and meaning.” This is due, in particular, to the search for 
universality. The less a norm is abstract, the more specific is its scope, which renders the 
universality sought by human rights practically impossible.
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Shivji (1989, p.8) warns against the danger of legalizing human rights, highlighting 
the ideological and historical components in a colonialist bias of these rights. That is it 
addresses the issue in a socio-historical and non-normative context.
The author uses a historical and discursive approach, which consists of a study of 
the rights, from a philosophical perspective, from a social, economic and political context, 
thus allowing a reasoning and reflection of the various rights, namely, the concepts of 
equality, self-determination and life within a geopolitical framework of peoples. It adopts 
a historical approach in that it analyzes the evolution of human rights from the historical 
context in which they were created and developed. It states that the concepts of equality 
and rights have an ideological basis. Thus, it adopts a discursive approach, insofar as it 
analyzes the ideologies of the world powers, which were the basis of the appearance and 
legalization of these rights.
From a historical-ideological construction, the author explains the ideological 
separation between developed and developing countries. On the other hand, Baxi (2006) 
adopts a dialectical approach of inclusion and exclusion. That is, the author considers that 
the construction and deconstruction of norms, standards and values  of human rights belong 
to a dialectical process and inclusion and exclusion. The author refers to intertextuality 
as having a political component, and several hierarchical constructions of human rights 
exclude the textuality of the same rights. There is a need here for the existence of points 
of contact between positions, thus proposing a union. Neither of these approaches has a 
normative aspect, being certain that, for Shivji, the author considers there is, for example, 
a contextual element of socio-historical order that is not considered.
Baxi (2006) points out that every act of writing and interpreting implies questioning 
the notions of authorship and authority of a text. For this, the author relies on Michel 
Foucault’s thought in which the very notion of author is problematized in the face of the 
constant proliferation of possibilities of interpretation. This is because, for Baxi (2006, 
p. 170) “indeterminate power of interpretive communities has indeed been far-reaching 
not only because its ‘authorship’ remains multitudinous in case of treaties and instruments 
but also improvised as in the case of usual Reading of the international as a source of law 
Donnelly (2006, p.68) points out some interesting points in this interpretation of human 
rights, namely: the existence of a legal consensus at the international level regarding regard 
to human rights, relatively superficial and not very comprehensive. Beyond the fact that 
the law reflects or materializes the interest of the powerful. Donnelly (2006, p.69) points 
to the exclusionary process of defining human rights, in that it leaves out individuals and 
groups of people, both at the national and transnational levels.
In a especial way, it is important to emphasize what Moyn says in his publication 
named Christian Human Rights. He writes, “[T]he general thesis of Christian Human 
Rights is that through this lost and misremembered transwar era, it is equally if not more 
viable to regard human rights as a project of the Christian right, not the secular left. 
Their creation brought about a break with the revolutionary tradition and its droits de 
l’homme, or —better put— successful capture of that language by forces reformulating 
their conservatism” (2015, p. 8).
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Moyn considers that human dignity has become a central argument in Christian 
political discourse since 1937. For this author, both the Christian Democratic parties as 
well as the Catholic Church itself and the Protestant churches took charge of promoting 
the discussion around religious piety in the years immediately prior to the outbreak of 
World War II. On the other hand, with the end of the war, the governments of Western 
Europe tried to highlight this process. Thus, human rights end up gaining public 
space as a result of these two movements at the beginning of the Cold War. And he 
concludes:
In the 1940s, as much as in and through some of em contemporary legacies, 
Christian human rights have been not so much about the inclusion of the 
other as about policing the borders and boundaries on which threatening 
enemies loom. And so the story of Christian human rights shows how our 
premier pincipeles have a complex itinerary. Like all inheritances, it is 
Worth tough criticismo rather than unreflective admiration. (2015, p.04)
In The Conservative Human Rights Revolution, Marco Duranti (2017) offers an 
analysis of the emergence of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
the European Court of Human Rights, in which the author shows a very close perspective 
and argues that conservatives of England and France (including French Catholics and 
British socialists), after World War II, conceived this document as a way of restricting 
democratic capacity of elected governments to implement leftist policies, aiming at the 
exclusion of communists from the European project, on the one hand and, on the other, 
the refutation of equal safeguard to colonized people. “If there was any revolutionary turn 
in the history of human rights”, evinces Marco Duranti (2017, p.23), it was both European 
and conservative in nature.
Precisely because of this cultural and historical context, for many the banner 
of the universality of human rights remains questioned.2 This is because the historical 
understanding of the struggle for human dignity should consider the efforts of societies 
subjugated by tyranny and European imperialism. Unfortunately, such efforts are not part 
of the official narrative of human rights.
3. eurocentrIsm In the dIscourse of human rIghts
Fernandez (1991, p. 79) states that “human rights have their anthropological 
foundation in the idea of  human needs. Its recognition, exercise and protection of these 
rights are intended to satisfy a series of requirements that are considered necessary for 
the development of a dignified life “From this idea of  human needs, the most diverse 
foundations that are the basis for human rights arise.
2 One must consider: VILLEY, M 2007, Law and Human rights, Martins Fontes, São Paulo. MUTUA, M 
2008, Human rights: a political and cultural critique, University of pennsylvania Press, EUA. SANTOS, B S 
2003, For a multicultural conception of human rights. In: SANTOS B S (Ed.) Recognizing for making free: 
the paths of cultural cosmopolitanism. Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro.
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Mutua (2002, p.10) considers that the human rights movement is marked by a very 
specific metaphor and that it has a connection with a parallel subtext linked to the great 
historical narrative of human rights, which portrays a relation between rapists, victims 
and saviors. This colonialist construction (rapists - victims - saviors) is considered a 
three-dimensional metaphor in which each dimension reveals a metaphor in itself. For 
the author, this three-dimensional representation of the corpus of human rights and its 
discourse would be unidirectional and predictable; a dichotomous construction that 
necessarily puts what is considered as “good” against what is regarded as “evil.”
In this sense, behind the discourses of justice, human rights, democracy, 
development, and even multiculturalism, in modern rhetoric, it underlies the colonial 
logic of a Eurocentric epistemology, namely, a standard of knowledge that is imposed 
as universal and categorizing of humanity. This logic is based on the idea that some (the 
saviors) are in a universal place, in such a way that they are the representation of the 
considered universal knowledge (adequate, impartial, equitable, good for all). On the 
other hand, the “others” (rapist-victims) are those who are in a particular and localized 
place and therefore should receive this knowledge. Thus, it is possible to find parities in 
the epistemic control that allowed the development of concepts such as in ferior peoples, 
barbarians, primitive and underdeveloped.
This colonialist and Eurocentric view defends the idea that Europe —and more 
contemporaneously with the West— implies the civilizing historical mission (the saviors), 
in order to remove the rest of humanity from its primitivism (rapist-victims), from its 
irrationality and of their underdevelopment, to then lead such peoples towards progress 
and rationality (Dussel, 2005, p. 59).
The first dimension of this prism comprises the wild and evokes images of 
barbarism. The acts committed by human rights violators are presented as cruel and 
unimaginable, so that they are represented as the denial of humanity.
In Mutua’s view (2002, p.10), the history of human rights presents the state as the 
classic rapist, a savage permanently committed to consuming humans. Although rape, 
in human rights discourse, involves much more than just the state, it is portrayed as an 
operational instrument of rights violations.
States become violators (savages) when they stifle and oppress civil society. The 
“good” state controls its oppressive tendencies, purifying itself and internalizing human 
rights. The “bad” state, in turn, is expressed through an anti-liberal, antidemocratic or 
authoritarian culture. The redemption of the state depends only on its submission to human 
rights norms. The state is the guarantor of human rights, it is also the target and the raison 
d’être of human rights norms.
But the reality is much more complex. Although the metaphor may suggest, it is 
not the state itself that constitutes itself as rapist or barbarian, but its cultural foundation. 
According to Mutua (2002, p.11), the state only becomes a rights abuser when “bad” 
culture surpasses or does not allow the development of “good” culture. Thus, the “real” 
rapist is not the state itself, but a culture diverted from human rights.
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The intrinsic savagery, both theoretically and practically, to the one-party state, to 
the military junta, to the controlled and closed state, to theocracy, or even that revealed 
in cultural practices such as female genital mutilation, are not to the state itself. The state 
as such is neutral, instrumentalizable —a receptacle— that violates rights insofar as it 
implements the design of a culture of violations.
It is important to emphasize that the conception of modernity was first elaborated, 
taking into account the contrast with the notion of “primitive”, represented not only by the 
past, but also by the new discoveries, leading to the need for overcoming, consummated 
by Enlightenment. In this passage from a lower condition to a higher condition, we find, 
for Mignolo (2010), the condition for the establishment of European epistemic hegemony.
In this picture, it is certain that the production of knowledge implies logically the 
existence of subjects who have the power to enunciate them and others who are necessarily 
subject to them, that is, they are limited to the position of mere spectators when not relegated 
to the condition of objects of knowledge. In this context, some have epistemic credibility 
(saviors) and others do not have legitimation for theoretical reflections considered as valid 
(rapist-victim), using Mutua’s relational conception.
The official perception of human rights, present in traditional doctrine, is marked 
by this European liberal theory, which corroborates the theoretical and political elements 
necessary for the foundation of national states or, in the context of the economic and 
political relations of the period in question, of the colonial metropolises (Quijano, 2005).
Exactly because of this cultural and historical context, the banner of the universality 
of human rights remains questioned. This is because the historical understanding of the 
struggle for human dignity should consider the efforts of societies subjugated by tyranny 
and European imperialism. Unfortunately, such efforts are not part of the official narrative 
of human rights.
However, according to Barreto (2013, p. 3) a non-Eurocentric translation of human 
rights can be carried out by means of a complex process which for this author comprises 
at least three moments: first, a critique of Eurocentric theory; second, the recovery, 
reconstruction or consideration of the non-European tradition of values  and cultures; and, 
lastly, the effective realization of a critical dialogue between the different traditions. The 
first move would be towards stripping the European theory of its alleged universal validity 
and pointing out that Europe is not the exclusive place from which it is possible to theorize 
about human rights. Here it is important to clarify that, when the author refers to Europe, 
he does so taking into account the Habermasian philosophical meaning of the term, for 
whom this conception includes not only the European continent, but also those countries 
which have harmonized and developed to a considerable degree the basic patterns of 
European modernity, such as the United States, Australia, and Japan. Thus, the concept of 
Europe would be equivalent to that of the West or the Western world.
In recent times, critical views of the standard version of human rights have been 
developed, which account for the Eurocentric character of their themes, as well as their 
origins and historiography.
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The alternative proposed by Shivji (1989) involves the understanding of the 
Discourse of Human Rights and the extension of these rights, through a reconstruction 
and reconceptualization so that it does not become a part of the dominant project, rather 
than the liberator, thus recognizing human rights as global and collective rights. Thus, 
the language of Human Rights should be implemented, articulating the pressing concerns 
of the vast majority, and at the same time providing a language of resistance against and 
changing existing conditions. There must be an awareness of the different perspectives of 
Human Rights, so that one can know how to promote them, in the interests of whom and 
in what direction.
Therefore, there must be a reconceptualization of human rights, in order to make 
them an ideology of resistance.
4. the Issue of multIculturalIsm and human rIghts
The ethical values  of a community vary according to the historical point of view 
and depend on specific circumstances. If this occurs within the same community, imagine 
in comparison to the values  of different societies. This question is vitally important as 
regards the debate on the possibility of establishment of universal human rights references 
for all nations of the globe or not. The search for an ideal of justice must necessarily 
take into account respect for the other, its history, the context of domination in which 
it lives or lived, its fullness as a being. This involves considering the cultural ethos. 
But how to find the right Aristotelian medium? Cançado Trindade (2003) reveals with 
special propriety that the Vienna Conference of 1993 can be considered as the mark of 
universalism-relativism tension. Proof of this can be deduced from the characteristically 
relativistic intervention made by the representative of the Chinese delegation, stating 
that the historical-cultural aspect of human rights, putting them in tow of the stage of 
development and own understanding of each country of the same.
In this regard, the statement by China’s Nobuo Matsunaga spokesperson:
The concept of human rights is the product of historical development. It is 
closely linked to specific social, political and economic conditions, and to 
the specific history, culture, and values  of a particular country. Different 
stages of historical development have different human rights requirements. 
Countries with different stages of development or with different historical 
traditions and cultural background also have a different understanding and 
practice of human rights. (Statement by Nobuo Matsunaga, envoy of the 
Japanese government and representative of Japan. Vienna, 06/15/1993).
The answer in a diametrically opposite direction would be given by Barroso, 
representative of the delegation of Portugal, who, in a statement made the following day, 
argued:
It would be our presumption and a clear abuse to think that instead of 
recognizing and guaranteeing, the community of States grants or creates 
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the rights of men. It follows that the State […] must respect the rights 
and dignity of its citizens and can not, in the name of alleged collective, 
economic, security or other interests, exceed the frontier imposed on it by 
the very human rights and their primacy over any purpose or function of the 
State. It can not do so either for reasons of economic power or prosperity, or 
for reasons which are apparently higher and purer in moral terms, such as 
religion, ideologies, philosophical or political views. (Statement by Dr. José 
Manuel Durão Barroso, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Vienna, 
16.06.1993) and he adds in his statement the fator of what he considers the 
obviousness of the principle of universality “ compatible with the cultural, 
religious and ideological diversity, assurring that the variety of beliefs, 
ideas, and human opinions, itself is a richness to defend and has a particular 
value that it is importante to respect (Barroso, 1993).
He cautions that using the argument of cultural diversity to establish limitations 
on individual rights, as unfortunately the speeches made were pointing there and beyond, 
would not be permissible, either in logical or moral terms.
However, history has revealed that morality does not necessarily have to do with 
the culture of a country. Regardless of the cultural background they have accumulated, 
countries have already been able to commit real atrocities to their nationals. Examples of 
this are innumerable, but two examples of distinct cultures seem to be exemplary: Nazism 
in Germany and the case of the Araguaia disappeared between 1972 and 1975.
It is a fact that Brazil and Germany are very different countries in relation to culture. 
In Nazi Germany, “the prisoner did not lose only freedom and communication with the 
outside world. He was stripped of all his possessions: clothes, personal objects, hair, 
and dental prostheses. He was, above all, emptied of his own being, of his personality” 
(Comparato, 2001, p. 23).
In Brazil, between 1972 and 1975, the Brazilian Armed Forces undertook 
campaigns of repression against members of the so-called Guerrilha do Araguaia. In 1973, 
the President of the General Republic Medici took control over the repressive operations 
and the official order happened to be of elimination of the captured ones. By the end of 
1974, there were no more guerrillas in the Araguaia, and there is information that their 
bodies were unearthed and burned or thrown into the rivers of the region. The military 
government put silence on the events of Araguaia and forbade the press to divulge news. 
In 2010, Brazil was convicted before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for 
violating the human rights of political disappears during the military period. In 2014 he 
was again convicted of enforced disappearances in the period and prepared a report on 
reparations for the victims until March 2015.
These are just two examples of countries with different cultures that went so far as 
to violate the human rights of their own nationals. Situations such as these demonstrate, 
in view of Ramos (2005, 61), “the need for an international normative framework in the 
defense of human rights, which would prevent violations of these rights evaluated by 
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domestic law”. It is noteworthy that in both situations States were acting in accordance 
with the law, which had no relation to morality.
Radbruch (1974, p. 415) focuses positivism, and relating his teaching to national 
laws, he explains that, in these situations (Nazism, Germany and the crime of forced 
disappearance in Brazil), “positivism was what left defending the people and the lawyers 
against the most arbitrary, cruel and most criminal laws.”
The need for a Universal Declaration of Human Rights is due to the fact that, 
precisely, there are different cultures that, regardless of the Western point of view, violate 
human rights. Gorender (2004, p. 21) explains that human rights, despite their universal 
and universalizing character, were “formalized in the context of the liberal-democratic 
state, as it developed in the Western European world in the course of the nineteenth 
century, which proclaimed as inalienable rights of man the rights to life, civil liberties and 
public liberties.”
Leaving the examples of Western countries on the African continent, for example, 
in some countries, not very different from here, freedom of expression and physical 
integrity are blocked, since, according to Farias (2016), “there is torture in prisons and 
there is a heavy-handed police response to public protest.”
Cases of human rights violations sound just as affronts to local customs and happen 
all the time around the world. Look at what happened in Mozambique when “a woman 
entered a space reserved for boy initiation rites and was ‘punished’ by order of the person 
in charge of the ceremony, who ordered a collective violation. She was sexually raped by 
17 men.”3
The examples pointed out demonstrate that regardless of the cultural values  proper 
to each community, what is most needed to be preserved is respect for each human being 
as such.
That is why discussions on the theme of universalism or human rights relativism 
add up to a new element that concerns differences or equality as considered or discussed 
in the context of human rights.
Bauman (2003, p. 97) places a particularly lucid position on this alleged polemic, 
revealing what may at first appear to be an insuperable dichotomy, but which actually 
contains, at its core, two political projects of linkage and domination. And he goes 
further by considering that across lines the new neglect of difference is theorized with the 
recognition of what he calls “cultural pluralism” whose informed and defended politics 
is known as multiculturalism. For this author, liberal-minded multiculturalism is aimed at 
3 Regarding gender-based violence in the name of culture, it is valid to visit the following web site: 
VIOLATION GRAVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN THE NAME OF TRADITION. Available in: 
http://www.forumulher.org.mz/index.php/noticias/113-violacao-grave-dos-direitos-humanos-das-mulheres-
emnome-da-tradicao. Accessed on January 15, 2016.
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tolerance both in relation to the rights of communities and the self-affirmation and public 
recognition of their identities by choice or by tradition. Until then there is no problem. The 
question arises on the average where, behind an apparent liberality, conservative forces 
hide their effect on maintaining the status quo of historical inequalities, because they start 
from the assumption of “it always was like that, so we have to respect”.
The moral ugliness of deprivation is miraculously reincarnated in the 
aesthetic beauty of cultural diversity. What was lost sight of in the process 
was that the demand for recognition is disarmed unless it is sustained by 
the practice of redistribution —and that the Community’s affirmation of 
cultural specificity serves little comfort to those who, thanks to the ever 
greater inequality in the division of resourses, have to accept that they are 
imposed on them. (Bauman, 2003, p.98).
According to Douzinas (2009, p. 373), “we have the feeling of being surrounded by 
injustice without knowing where justice lies.” A Westerner, for example, may be appalled 
by certain Indian practices, such as the situation of Dalits, or with the possibility that a 
Muslim may be married to four women while he lives in a democratic society in which he 
can only marry a woman. In addition, as an essential observation, we would like to inform 
you that in Asia there is no expectation of the creation of an Asian Commission or Court of 
Human Rights to date, nor is there an instrument to protect them (Mazzuoli, 2015, p.156). 
The main argument is that the Asian reality can not be compared to Western human rights 
because they are based on individualism, which is inadequate to Eastern societies, which 
give priority to the community.4
There are even countries like China, Singapore and Malaysia that challenge 
the universalism of human rights. According to Kretschmann (2008, p. 170), “ideas of 
freedom, equality and democracy were fundamental to the affirmation of human rights in 
the West.” These ideas, however, are not essential in other cultures.
In Hindu view, it is considered not the individual itself, as the starting point, but 
a complex tote of the real. It differs from the Western view, in which each individual 
is absolute, irreducible to another, that is, the individual is above the considerations of 
society and the State. Moreover, the idea of  democracy and social order not hierarchically 
based on it (unlike Hindu caste system) is fundamental to the West. To Hindu view, 
Western human rights are overly anthropocentric. Kretschmann (2004, p.182) states that 
in hindu society “order is first valued, and hence the conformity of each element to its role 
as a whole, to society as a whole. The needs of man are ignored or subordinated to the 
collective.”
4 On this website, we can find more information on the Asian countries’ view on the Universality of human 
rights and the justification by which it does not sign treaties. SILVA, Cristina Gomes da. Perspectivas 
asiáticas dos Direitos humanos. Available in: http://www.dhnet.org.br/direitos/sip/textos/silva_dh_asia.pdf. 
Accessed on January 11, 2016.
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In Islam, according to Vincent (2001, p. 42), the community of believers takes 
precedence over the individual, and he must act in a way that preserves his community, 
such as acknowledging that the community provides the integration of his personality 
through self-denial and action for the good of the community. Individual rights will remain 
subject to duties towards the community; Islam adopts the notion of the unity of mankind, 
but accepts no sovereign other than the authority constituted by reason of faith, so that 
religion and politics must be led by a sovereign.
From the viewpoint sustained by Kretschmann (2004: 213), “in this sense, some of 
the greatest obstacles to the practice of human rights and democracy, implying a separate 
regime of religion, would come from Islam.” The Konrad-Adenauer-Stifung Foundation 
(1998, p.96), considers that the claim that the Islamic religion is incompatible with the 
idea and practice of human rights is unfounded: “The fundamental difference lies in the 
fact that in Islam the individual right never is placed absolutely, but there is always in 
relation to the law before God, every divine creation and before the human creature.”
A concrete example of Islamic ideological conflict with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights was with reference to Articles 17 and 19, because Egypt expressed 
reservations with these articles. Article 17 of the Declaration provides for freedom to 
marry regardless of race, religion or nationality. In Egypt and in almost all Muslim 
countries there are restrictions and limitations on the marriage of Muslim women to 
people belonging to different religions. According to Kretschmann (2004, p. 278), “it is 
a religious limitation,” stresses its representative, adding that, despite such a reservation, 
such a provision does not hurt universal consciousness, as it does when restricting freedom 
is based the nationality, race or color of the person.”
The Asian opposition to Universal Declaration of Human Rights was primarily 
concerned with language because of the individualistic, legalistic assertion of Western 
rights that would be foreign to its moral culture. It was not a disagreement about values, 
but about articulate form. The Chinese prefer to articulate and defend such rights by a 
community-based, moral, and appropriate bias of obligations, and by a mutual conviction 
of a society as a whole (Parekh, 1999, p.155). According to Kretschmann (2008, p. 282), 
“Asians argued that conventional declarations of human rights prescribe the flags of 
Western liberal-democratic governments. There should be, for the Chinese, no privilege 
of the individual over the community.”
It is worth noting that at the time of the drafting of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, “not all members of the United Nations at the time fully shared the 
convictions expressed in the document: although unanimously approved, the Communist 
countries (Soviet Union, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia), Saudi 
Arabia and South Africa abstained from voting” (Comparato 2001, p. 226). The idea of 
universality was called into question by the lack of unanimity due to ideological conflict.
Currently, there is no national law immune to international human rights norms. 
In general, States accept the progressive limitation of their sovereignty because they need 
international cooperation on trade issues and to deal with transboundary problems.
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On the idea of  the universality of human rights, Kretschmann (2008: 274) points 
out that:
This idea, adopted by the UN General Assembly in the Universal 
Declaration of 1948, was also called into question by the lack of unanimity, 
given the abstentions of the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, 
generating three types of challenges to the principle of universality: the 
ideological conflict, which was expressed in different interpretations of 
the idea of  human rights. These cultural differences constitute the greatest 
civilizational challenges to Human Rights.
The universality of human rights constitutes a normative claim on the mode of 
organization of political and social relations in the contemporary world, and not a historical 
or anthropological fact. Its proponents consider it essential to put a stop to the conduct of 
bad rulers, which, according to them, would be a solution as Barreto (2010, p.16) proposes 
for the realization of human rights, so that they go from deontological to ontological, 
in other words, from the world of duty to the world of being “to make the promise of 
human rights a reality, it is only necessary to enact them in the laws, to train judges and 
to indoctrinate the police.” And, moreover, to respect differences between countries. This 
is what the Vienna Declaration sought when it emphasized the importance of respecting 
the particularities of each sovereign state. Bauman (2003, p.103) follows in its own right 
when referring to the recognition of cultural variety as a beginning and not the end of the 
question, insofar as it is a political process of dialogue and negotiation in order to overcome 
contenders and lower. In discussing the phenomenon of multiculturalism, Taylor (2009, 
38) argues that respect for equality requires the imperious respect of the fundamental 
rights of the individual and recognition of minority cultures, to which Habermas adds the 
element of the “constitutional democratic state” absent from Taylor’s argument. Based 
on the assumption that the recognition of cultural diversity is a right and a proper starting 
point for a coherent discussion of the constitutive axiological values human action and 
able to order it, Habermas element of the constitutional state must be added as a necessary 
and guiding framework for this debate.
But Bauman (2003, p. 125) goes further and uses the thought of another thinker 
who transcends the western establisment, namely, Cornellius Castoriadis, adding the 
elemento “Autonomous society” of his theory of political autonomy; a society is only 
conceived autonomous insofar as its members are fully autonomous, have freedom of 
conscience, politically conceived, in the choice of their acts. Reason why this is a political 
autonomy. Autonomy envisioned within the scope of the polis, in relation to the position 
of the individual in the nation, or as Bauman prefers “in the republic”.
5. conclusIon
At the end of this brief essay, let us remember Marx in “On a Jewish question”, when 
he defines that a holistic expression of the individual is the way to display a legitimately 
conquered, eliminating as possible reductions in the explanation of an emancipation only 
through strands unique, but fully calculated in all aspects of the founding company.
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There are cases in which the law as conceived and current position, is still governed 
by the monist and centralizing system of a state model that is still democratic in law, but 
in a liberal political perspective, objectively, especially in the Brazilian case, it is not 
managing to obtain a efficient response in terms of social justice that contemplates both 
cultural transformations and the need to protect the traditions and cultural heritage of the 
different ethnic groups, especially those used for the globalization of capitalism.
Contradictorily, the State to seek to follow social evolution, and by using the 
principle of prohibition, without paying attention to the specificities of each cultural 
aspect, ends up advancing due to those practices performed in social exclusion of the 
groups it encounters because it does not have rights protected by positive state legal order. 
Such measured social groups in which they lack protection and guarantees, seek on the 
basis of human rights or an item of emancipation from the State; legitimized by the human 
rights body, it can claim or establish rules of rules, many of them prior to the advent status 
itself, fruits of ancient uses, costumes and traditions, in a universe parallel to the statistical 
right of registration of a non-state right, but currently since already as a right, although it 
does not come from the State; even though they recognize the positivized state authority.
These pluralist practices and their efficiency in the reality of the States, as well as 
the effectiveness of their measures considered as different barriers imposed by the State 
so that society does not achieve its emancipation.
In addition to the defenders of this anthropological-philosophical conception 
based on the idea of  rationality, human rights are constituted as a moral, legal and political 
project, a product of modernity in the West, whose experience, maturity and, above all, 
political authority have accredited it to export or transplant to the rest of the world. That is 
why the origins of human rights have little or nothing to do with the history and rationality 
of non-Western peoples.
Amid all these cultural differences, what remains of equality is the fact that a society 
is made up of people, with equal dignity, with equal value, who are priceless. People of 
different civilizations have different views on the relations between the symbolic and 
the men, the individual and the collective, the citizen and the state, parents and children, 
husband and wife, as well as different views about the relative importance of rights and 
responsibilities, freedom, authority, equality. Such differences are the result of centuries 
of history.
What is proposed with this essay is the exercise of a critical reflection on the official 
narrative of human rights; its limits, although hindering the conjecture of other glances, 
can not obstruct the perspective towards other paths that allow the necessary reflection 
towards a human rights movement that is more than a multicultural transcendent to more 
than universal, that is inclusive and profoundly political.This contribution is to get us to 
see that human rights cannot hover forevermore above history.
In the face of different views and the fact that states have gone so far as to commit 
atrocities against their own nationals, there is a need for human rights norms beyond 
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dogmatics. Such norms are purposely abstract so that they can be applied more easily in 
countries, regardless of their respective cultures, but lack effectiveness.
The difficulty in achieving the universality of human rights lies in the fact that 
there is no absolute morality, but different moral system coexisting with one another.
Rethinking human rights means taking into account the idea of  human rights as the 
product of a development that needs to be inclusive and global, considering the existence 
and participation of more than one qualified social actor and a society whose sign is 
solidarity and tolerance process.
This re-elaboration necessarily involves a multiplicity of actors whose contribution, 
both culturally and socially, will be of fundamental importance for changing the 
conception, direction and objectives of human rights. The fulfillment of norms concerning 
human rights, even when these are not in keeping with the culture of their country, leads 
to the conclusion that in this action lies a true moral content, which in Kant’s eyes means 
the fulfillment is not for duty, but out of duty. This respect is essential as globalization 
advances every day and respect for human rights is a positive factor on the international 
stage, facilitating cooperation between the various States.
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